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      Tactics geeks of the world unite...

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      Scottbot
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #690: Mar 30, 2016 10:50:23 am
      Our set-piece taking has been chronic for a while now.  Not only is Henderson poor at taking them, but he's hardly the kind of player who could be at the edge of the box and smash in a rebound.

      He'd be better back on our half way line while Sakho, Lovren or Skrtel went up to try and get their head on it.

      Some of our best corners I've seen this season have been taken by the younger players in the cup games - which suggests at least that it is something they work on at the Academy.

      I don't know enough about Klopp's 'Dortmund years' but I'd like to think it is something that he will be interested in improving.

      For us, for a few seasons now, corners have been all pain and no gain.

      (I've cut Milner a bit of slack as he is at least pretty good at the set-piece from the spot)


      Agree completely, corners have been especially poor for many years. Stevie took an incredible free kick but his corners were never the best and I always felt he should be in the box where his under-rated aerial ability could have been exploited on a regular basis (I'm certain he would have scored another 10 goals had he not taken corners for LFC).

      Coutinho isn't the long-term answer either (for corners or FKs) but he is the best of a bad bunch. Either way someone needs to get hold of Henderson and quietly let him know 'it's not for you son' because his delivery is woeful.

      Maybe that's why we keep taking these awful short corners this season? They have been nearly as poor as the balls into the box!
      harrydunn08
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #691: Mar 30, 2016 02:37:15 pm
      Maybe that lad Charlie Adam is available.... I've heard his corners alone are worth 10M  :)

      I like Moreno, but if I have to watch him take one more set piece I will lose my F***ing mind!!!  His delivery and shooting from set pieces is tragic.....
      HUYTON RED
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #692: Mar 30, 2016 03:04:58 pm
      I like Moreno, but if I have to watch him take one more set piece I will lose my F***ing mind!!!  His delivery and shooting from set pieces is tragic.....

      Try and think how some of us feel watching him try and defend!! And then there are those stupid lunges that he does......
      harrydunn08
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #693: Mar 30, 2016 03:08:18 pm
      Try and think how some of us feel watching him try and defend!! And then there are those stupid lunges that he does......


      At least he wins the ball on most of his stupid lunges.  They do look risky as hell, but he usually seems to pull them off and I'm pretty sure that he makes more recovery tackles than any other player in the Prem....
      HScRed1
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #694: Apr 01, 2016 03:36:45 pm
      A really insightful analysis

      http://statsbomb.com/2016/04/liverpool/
      reddebs
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #695: Jul 16, 2016 05:09:45 pm
      If some kind person can post the graphics where they're supposed to be I will be eternally grateful

      Team Analysis: Jürgen Klopp’s Liverpool

      von EA am 15.07.2016 in den Kategorien Europa League,Premier League,Team Portraits mit 0 Kommentaren

      The final day of the 2014-15 season saw Brendan Rodgers’ Liverpool side get thrashed 6-1 by a mediocre Stoke team. After challenging for the title in the previous season, the transfer of Luis Suarez and poor health of Daniel Sturridge created big issues and performance dropped off a cliff. Whilst Rodgers was previously able to rely on his talented personnel, he struggled to implement a consistent strategy from this point onwards. He was granted the start of the 2015-16 season to rectify the issues, but was unable to do so. He was sacked after a 1-1 draw with Everton in October. A few days later, Jürgen Klopp was hired.

      Klopp has already made a number of changes to the systems utilised under Rodgers, and Liverpool have shown many promising signs despite clear tactical and personnel issues.
      Pressing and counterpressing

      One major tool used by Jürgen Klopp is the infamous counterpress: attempting to regain possession immediately after losing it. Whilst Rodgers’ Liverpool were a high pressing team at their peak in 2013-14, this often came in established possession rather than actively focusing on recovering the ball immediately. But during 2014-15, the team even began to lose their focus on pressing itself as Rodgers found himself stuck between philosophies.

      Whilst the nuances of counterpressing can take many months to fully implement, Klopp was able to make immediate improvements.
      Progression of Liverpool’s counterpress over the 2015-16 Premier League season

      Progression of Liverpool’s counterpress over the 2015-16 Premier League season

      On Jürgen Klopp’s debut (game 9 of the season), Liverpool visited another team focused heavily on counterpressing, Mauricio Pochettino’s Tottenham. With less than a week of training, Klopp was already able to instill a few key principles of counterpressing into the team. Despite this, many of the suitable support structures were not in place to implement a successful post-counterpress transition (after only days of coaching, this is to be expected). This created a match with many individual duels and second balls, but little sustained possession or clean combination play.

      The general aggression of the counterpress was vastly increased, but more importantly, the triggers for counterpressing were seemingly more clearly defined than under Rodgers. The main signal for triggering an ultra-aggressive counterpress was the opponent receiving the ball with his back to [Liverpool’s] goal. This is the most common trigger in general, because makes it more difficult for the receiving ball-player to view or access the game behind him. It reduces his passing options and makes it easier for the ball to be regained. If the ball is not won back quickly, then it forces the opponent into a backwards pass and gives the team additional time to re-structure.

      Another core principle the players exhibited almost immediately was a more intense press in the wing area. This is simply because of the lack of connectivity to the other areas of the pitch.
      Fewer areas of the pitch are immediately accessible from the wing ([LINK]from TP’s Empoli team analysis[/LINK])

      Fewer areas of the pitch are immediately accessible from the wing (from TP’s Empoli team analysis)

      The simplicity of these instructions made it easy for the team to co-ordinate the press after little training time together, but they were not yet able to assess the situation for themselves or alter the intensity of the press. This meant that even if the team had poor initial pressing access, the midfield would still press aggressively without closing passing lanes, allowing Tottenham an easy route out.

          Liverpool on Klopp's debut: ultra-aggressive in flooding area around ball, but lacking structure for clean regain. pic.twitter.com/62HHcftKze

          — Ed (@edAfootball) June 14, 2016

      Klopp was quickly able to improve on these base rules. More complex principles were introduced, and the counterpress peaked around the turn of the year, despite an injury crisis. Perhaps the success would have been improved even further if the team did not (rightly or wrongly) prioritise their Europa League campaign over the Premier League.
      An example of a common early pressing trap: allowing the ball to return to the halfspace after it previously reached the wing.

      An example of a common early pressing trap: allowing the ball to return to the halfspace after it previously reached the wing.

      Around this time, the team began to introduce pressing and counterpressing traps based on the key taught principles. The most commonly used trap was to force the opposition into a wider area, and allow a single open passing lane into the halfspace. Based on the position of the ball, this player was forced to have an outwards-facing field of vision, and would be pressed heavily from all directions upon receiving the ball. Backwards pressing from the ball-side attacking midfielder played a key role in ensuring the opposition could not merely recycle possession.

      The specifics of the trap itself varied depending on the system used and opposition faced. For example, a less aggressive version of the same press may be to force a ball backwards to a central defender. If co-ordinated previously, this allows the central midfielder to aggressively press the opposition receiver. With sufficiently altered movement to close potential passing lanes, this can force a long ball forward.

      But the other key reason that Liverpool’s counterpress improved during the season was the preparation for the counterpress during the possession phase. As the year went on, many more of Liverpool’s attacks were forced to the wing.
      Percentage of all potential counterpress opportunities in the opposition half that occurred on the wing

      Percentage of all potential counterpress opportunities in the opposition half that occurred on the wing

      Whilst this can have disadvantages in attacking, it creates more stability if the ball is lost. With a strong central presence, it becomes much easier to defend transitions that start from the wing because of the reduced passing options the opposition immediately has.

      This increase was largely due to two connected reasons. Firstly, the emphasis of Liverpool’s attacks has gradually moved wider: in the first half of the Premier League season, no team completed a lower percentage of their opposition half passes on the wing. This improved to 13th in the league for the second half of the season.

      In facilitating this focus on wider possession, the team’s structure improved and began to focus more on utilising the halfspace as a means to attack rather than the centre itself. This was particularly the case in Klopp’s 4-3-2-1 shape, where both the attacking midfielders and outside central midfielders would spend much of their time in the halfspace (with license to drift wide depending on the movements and positioning of their teammates).

      This increased focus on the halfspace had a big effect on attacking midfielders Firmino & Lallana, but neither were the very best contributor…
      Individual counterpressing contributions, and effect on the team's ability to regain possession quickly

      Individual counterpressing contributions, and effect on the team’s ability to regain possession quickly

      Initially brought in as the ‘Welsh Xavi’, Allen has found himself without a defined role at post-Rodgers Liverpool. Injury troubles have contributed to a lack of consistent starts, but even when fit Allen has struggled to start games regularly. There are questions about his physicality (or lack thereof) and how this can be a detriment in Klopp’s system, where second ball duels in tight spaces form a key part of a midfielder’s role.

      Despite this, his contributions to the counterpress when he does feature are unparalleled. In general pressing phases, his contribution to regaining possession is more indirect: closing passing lanes and adjusting to his teammates’ movements with intelligent decision making. Within the counterpress, his ability to regain the ball himself is magnified due to his impressive in-possession positioning. Particularly when the ball reaches the final third, it is rare that Allen is more than one pass away. This allows him to easily shift towards the opposition, or aggressively close the ball-player if the situation demands.

      As the outer central midfielder in the 4-3-2-1, he was given license to make extreme vertical movements forward. In advanced positions, he provides good value in stabilising possession with good decision-making. If a quick combination play is available, then he facilitates this with quick feet, but also understands when the tempo needs to be reduced. This general game intelligence is perhaps one of the reasons he makes such an impact as a sub, and why his GoalImpact score is one of the highest in the Liverpool squad (2nd only to Jordan Henderson).
      Increasing horizontal compactness and ball-orientation

      Improved ball-oriented shifting was one of the key features that Klopp was able to implement into Liverpool’s press almost immediately. During Liverpool’s peak under Brendan Rodgers, there was often an aggressive initial press without suitable compactness and ball-orientation. This means if the opposition break the initial press with quick feet or a sharp pass, there is an immediate transition opportunity.

      When the ball is in the centre, Klopp’s team will often disregard the wing and focus almost entirely on defending the halfspaces and centre. Whilst the centre is occupied, the team’s forward is tasked with closing inside passing lanes and forcing the opposition towards the unoccupied wings. The most common example comes when one opposition central defender has the ball – Liverpool’s forward disallows the pass to the other central defender whilst his teammates occupy the centre.

      This was one of the primary strengths of the 4-3-2-1 shape that Klopp used many times throughout the season. Once the pass has been forced to the opposition full-back, Liverpool’s outside central midfielder can aggressively press whilst closing the inside passing lane. The ball-side attacking midfielder can then curve his movement to ensure the opposition cannot recycle possession through their central defenders.
      Liverpool's pressing shape in their 4-3-2-1, from RM's analysis of Klopp's Liverpool debut

      Liverpool’s pressing shape in their 4-3-2-1, from RM’s analysis of Klopp’s Liverpool debut

      The players developed more intelligence in adapting their pressing movements as the season developed. The win against eventual Premier League winners Leicester was particularly impressive due to Liverpool’s dominance of the transition phase (one of Leicester’s key strengths).

      Because of the compactness of the two teams, much of Leicester’s transitions came from trying to stretch the pitch into the previously vacant wide areas. This limited the influence of Leicester’s central midfielders, and consistently forced build-up through the full-backs. If the ball was quickly regained, then the team could attempt a transition. For the opposition to stay suitably structured in the chaos of this transition moment requires huge levels of co-ordination. In many instances, it will create some large spaces (and many smaller spaces) that Liverpool can immediately exploit with quick vertical passing and sharp combination play.

          Liverpool force build-up into wide areas, then attempt to quickly transition into the newly opened spaces. pic.twitter.com/3FYmwgZMxN

          — Ed (@edAfootball) July 10, 2016

      The role of the attacking midfielders (generally Lallana & Firmino in the 4-3-2-1) in these instances was particularly interesting. Many times, when Liverpool’s forward forced the ball wide, they would remain in an advanced position, ready to press the opposition ball-side central midfielder should the ball return into the centre of the pitch. This adds another dimension to the press that was sometimes vacant when the team pressed in a 4-2-3-1 shape.
      Backwards pressing

      The nature of their positioning generally meant that these players were pressing backwards, often outside the opponent’s immediate field of vision. Lallana in particular benefited most from an extended shift to the 4-3-2-1 during game 21 of the season. This improvement, and their role in particular, mainly came in the form of picking the pocket of the opponent with a tackle from behind. Firmino & Lallana had the highest percentage of their counterpressing recoveries come as tackles of all Liverpool players.

      Aside from the player curving his movement to stay ‘out of view’ of the ball-player, these tackles often necessitate slightly different body positioning to an ordinary tackle. With the ball on the other side of the opponent, there is more need for use of the upper body to disrupt the balance of the opponent. This slight push can create a split-second of disorientation for the ball-player, particularly if he was unaware of the approaching presser.

      Additionally, sometimes a small ‘hop’ immediately prior to making the tackle can give the tackler an advantage when tackling from behind. This small jump has the added benefit of avoid the shield that some players naturally use to protect the ball. When the opponent’s leg is extended, it clearly has to be at an angle because of the biomechanics of the hip joint. Making a slight hop over the leg (if it is extended in a shielding motion) allows less diversion of tackler’s movement, making it easier to reach the ball quickly.

      Another vital advantage of this downwards force (after the peak of the natural trajectory of a jump) is that it creates enough force for a tackle and pass to be made in one motion. Instead of making an additional movement with his leg, the player can use the force generated from the jump to deflect the ball to a teammate.

      For obvious reasons, this quickens the process and reduces the likelihood the tackler will immediately lose the ball again. When there is a suitable support structure around the ball, this can create dangerous transitions through the use of combination play and third man runs. Within the 4-3-2-1, the two attacking midfielders would ball-orient in an attempt to overload the nearby zone. When this is the case, the ‘third man’ can anticipate the regain of possession. This creates the opportunity for the player to ensure he is open for a pass from the recipient of the tackle-pass, allowing the ball to be quickly moved away.

          An example of Liverpool's backwards pressing into immediate combination play. pic.twitter.com/afRRxxiMwe

          — Ed (@edAfootball) July 10, 2016

      Firmino & Lallana were the primary proponents of such techniques. Coutinho had more difficulty achieving this; despite curving his movement suitably, his tackling positioning was often poor. This makes the Liverpool press more one-dimensional, and is perhaps one key reason why the team were much less effective at regaining the ball with Coutinho on the pitch, despite the fact he had a similar number of direct regains from counterpressing (0.81 per 90 minutes) to Firmino (0.82) and Lallana (0.94).
      Defensive transition issues

      Focusing on counterpressing rather than dropping deep to regain structure is an inherently aggressive tactic. Klopp’s system is focused more on quickly closing the space around the ball with large numbers of players converging from all directions. The upside, as mentioned previously, is that this can allow the team to quickly regain possession and even start its own attacks.

      The downside is that an aggressive counterpress from deep in midfield can allow the opposition more opportunity to transition if the initial press is beaten. This effect is magnified if the team prepares poorly for the counterpress when in-possession, and does not have good pressing access from all sides of the ball to immediately flood the new opposition ball-player.

      Liverpool suffered from this very effect in the latter stages of the season, particularly when James Milner was utilised in a double pivot with Emre Can. Despite joining Liverpool largely to play in central midfield, Milner spent much of his time situated anywhere but central midfield in these moments.
      Milner’s positioning moments before a deadly Dortmund transition leading to a goal

      Milner’s positioning moments before a deadly Dortmund transition leading to a goal

      Not only does this poor structure make it more difficult to attack effectively, but it makes quickly regaining possession a near-impossible task. With such poor pressing access, Dortmund can easily escape.

      Milner also exhibited one of the other key negative traits that caused issues for Liverpool midfielders: an over-reliance on situational man-marking. Despite largely using a zonal-based system, occasionally the central midfielders would push forward and aggressively pursue potential passing options. Because of their backwards-facing field of vision and tight pressure from behind, this makes a pass into those players less likely. But it also leaves a large open space behind.

      Midfield man-marking

      This was exploited by the opposition on a number of occasions during the season, but chiefly by Dortmund and Henrikh Mkhitaryan. A 2v2 man-marking of the midfielders can leave space for the opposition #10 to drop into the space behind Liverpool’s midfield and receive the ball. This was particularly effective when the opposition were attempting to build from wide, and the full-back could play a diagonal ball into the halfspace behind Milner & Can. The ball-player is able to quickly accelerate into a 1v1 duel because he receives the ball on the half-turn. This forces the ball-side central defender into a difficult position, and in the case of Sakho & Lovren (with their naturally aggressive tendencies), will generally choose to confront the ball-player. For a successful confrontation, the central defender is forced to simultaneously attempt to close the passing lane and apply pressure to the ball-player. With sharp movements in front and behind of the defender and constantly shifting passing lanes – this makes it a very difficult situation to defend.
      Build-up disconnects

      The other key area the opposition were able exploit consistently in transition was behind Alberto Moreno. In general, Liverpool’s left side defense was much more porous than their right, and much of this was because of passes made behind Moreno. Whilst Nathaniel Clyne was generally more conservative in his movement, Moreno often pushed forward on the left.

      Liverpool’s softer left side (graph from [LINK]@SaturdayonCouch[/LINK])

      Liverpool’s softer left side (graph from @SaturdayonCouch)
      Whilst this advanced positioning in itself is not a problem, it often created a disconnect in Liverpool’s build-up play during the early months of Klopp’s tenure. Mamadou Sakho was the main passing hub in early build-up during these games, and the impact of his vertical passing ability was lessened due to Moreno’s advanced positioning. Not only does this overly-advanced positioning make it more difficult to reach him in build-up, but it also gives the opposition opportunity to transition behind him. Intelligent positioning from the opposition winger can block the passing lane without dropping too deep to limit his transition threat.

      Sometimes this effect can also create more pressure for Liverpool’s midfielders. Because of the distance of the pass needed to reach Moreno, his direct opponent can comfortably leave more space to cover, as he will have more time to reach Moreno whilst the pass is in motion. This allows them to create a more horizontally compact midfield, and allows less space to receive the ball in midfield.

          Moreno too high in build-up, allows opposition winger to simultaneously cover him + pressure Coutinho. Easy counter. pic.twitter.com/hMdbUjd0B9

          — Ed (@edAfootball) July 2, 2016

      Despite his good top speed, he can also find it difficult to turn quickly to ensure his direct opponent is not a threat in transition. This is due to his tendency to face towards the opposition goal whilst Liverpool has the ball, meaning he has to turn whilst his opponent faces the Liverpool goal. If possession is lost, he then has to turn before sprinting backwards, giving his opponent a head start. Even if he is facing inwards towards play from the left sideline, he still has to make a half-turn whereas his opponent can immediately move forward. When positioned on the same horizontal space on the pitch, this can make it difficult for Moreno to recover.

      Once Moreno recovers, he is excellent at making tackles or recovering the ball whilst sprinting. It makes sense to utilise him in an advanced role, as this fits his skillset and the requirements of the team. But this can be fine-turned; simply by dropping slightly deeper in build-up, he could increase his influence and limit the opponent’s opportunity to transition behind him if the ball is lot.

      Instead of pushing Moreno deeper in build-up though, this issue was ‘solved’ by shifting Sakho into a wider role in early build-up with a central midfielder often dropping between the two central defenders. Being situated in this wider position allowed Sakho to consistently find Moreno whilst still making his incisive laser passes into central areas. But the different midfield shape had a negative effect on Liverpool’s build-up generally – where once Emre Can would sit, now there was only space.

      Of his two-man-midfield partners, neither are able to consistently add value to build-up play. Milner’s proclivity to move away from central areas means he can often only be accessed after a horizontal shift in play rather than from an immediate central pass. Whilst Jordan Henderson has improved his touch and passing ability, his off-ball movement in these phases can be negligible.

      This dependence on Emre Can & Mamadou Sakho for ball progression is not sustainable for obvious reasons. This lack of midfield occupation merely gives the opposition more opportunity to counter, much like when Moreno is too advanced. Liverpool’s attacking midfielders will often attempt to fill this space by dropping deeper, and sometimes this creates some reasonably successful rotations. On the right-side Milner’s forward movements could be harnessed to disrupt opposition man-orientations with Lallana dropping into the vacant space, receiving the ball from Clyne in the halfspace. However, these simple movements cannot be relied upon to consistently progress play against strong opposition.
      Offensive transitions and pass availability

      With different personnel, Liverpool’s general attacking transition play varies wildly. Daniel Sturridge spent much of the season injured, but his return had a profound effect on Liverpool’s ability to consistently shift play forwards at speed. This was primarily down to his proclivity to drift ball-side (and particularly to the right) in transition. Whilst this is a strategically worse position for combination play and possession structure, it has some key advantages in transition for a player such as Sturridge.

      With few opposition defenders back, drifting wide allows the opportunity for Sturridge to create a 1v1 in space. Once the ball is under control, an inward-facing field of vision gives view of the entire pitch. The lengthier nature of an ‘outlet’ pass in transition means there is also more time for the receiving player to alter his body positioning (and therefore his field of vision) whilst the pass is in motion than a standard, shorter pass.

      Less capable dribblers have a tendency to remain facing their own goal when receiving the ball in the centre of the pitch. Indeed, Benteke will largely receive the ball facing his own goal regardless of his location on the pitch. As the most advanced player, it makes sense to do this – a backwards-facing field of vision allows him to view his teammates as they catch up with play. But it creates a blindspot where the opposition can press. Whilst Sturridge can move his field of vision towards the centre of the pitch as the pass is in motion, he is able to view more reference points and make a more informed decision of play. All Sturridge’s teammates can only move forwards on one side of him, whereas they could flood forwards on either side of Benteke. This can make it even harder for the player receiving centrally to assess the situation and make a quick decision, which is vital to successful transitions.

      If teammates are not able to progress as quickly as play, Sturridge is capable of shielding the ball or utilising sharp dribbling movements to move beyond his opponent. This is again made easier by the 1v1 created as he drifts into a wider position. With the movement wide disrupting the opposition’s horizontal compactness in defense, even if a 1v1 is unsuccessful then onrushing teammates will have more room to operate if Sturridge can make a pass to them.

      Sturridge is not the only Liverpool player with a multi-dimension skillset in offensive transitions. Divock Origi has vastly improved his timing of runs in behind, and his new-found strength makes it easier for him to keep Premier League central defenders from slowing him down in a tight tussle. Sadio Mane provides a huge transition threat, and had been invaluable in these situations at Southampton & Salzburg. Sturridge’s inclination to drift wide benefits Mane’s preference to move beyond the strikers (with a preference of starting on the left and moving inside).

      Danny Ings missed much of the 2015/16 season with injury, but is one of the top transition forwards in the league. Much like Sturridge, he is capable of playing as the outlet or reacting to an initial break and offering immediate support, with a fast-paced movement into the centre.
      Top 20 players in terms of fast-attacking expected goals per 90 minutes over the past four Premier League seasons. Minimum 2,700 minutes played. Three Liverpool players feature. Graph courtesy of @WillTGM

      Top 20 players in terms of fast-attacking expected goals per 90 minutes over the past four Premier League seasons. Minimum 2,700 minutes played. Three 2016/17 Liverpool players feature – here comes the speed. (Graph courtesy of @WillTGM)

      Jürgen Klopp famously said that the counterpress is the best playmaker. Despite an improved counterpress, the quantity of Liverpool transitions from these situations has not dramatically increased. This is perhaps a downside of the ‘space-oriented’ counterpress that Klopp operates with – when the players do not fully understand the system, there tends to be an emphasis on aggression over structure. If the pressing movements are not staggered, then this leaves few potential passing options once possession is regained.

      This clean regain of possession improved in general pressing, particularly with the blind-side tackling from Lallana & Firmino. But there are still improvements to be made. Feeding off passes from second balls and broken possessions was also one key reason Gotze found such success in Klopp’s system at Dortmund…
      The Future: 4-4-2-0?

      It is clear that many improvements have been made since Jürgen Klopp’s arrival on Merseyside. In terms of counterpressing and general pressing structures, this team is now totally different than the one that started the season under Brendan Rodgers. There seems to be more focus on adapting the system to individual challenges & fixtures, rather than completely ditching a style or system after a few bad results.

      One such system that was only explored briefly throughout the season, was a 4-4-2/4-6-0 used against Aston Villa. This came immediately after the controversial Sunderland match (due to a fan walkout at ticket prices and Klopp missing the game due to illness) where Liverpool utilised a heavily rotating midfield to counter Sunderland’s emphasis on man-marking.
      Situation from the Aston Villa match, and how Milner could have adapted his positioning to occupy the opposition central defender.

      Situation from the Aston Villa match, and how Milner could have adapted his positioning to occupy the opposition central defender – perhaps with a more capable striker, even both central defenders could be occupied.

      Having utilised a 4-3-2-1/4-3-3 system against Sunderland and in recent matches, it was suggested the same would be used. Against Aston Villa, though, Liverpool were able to utilise Roberto Firmino & Daniel Sturridge at the same time for the very first time that season (25 league games in). The natural movements of both players are to drift from a traditional centre forward position.

      One such situation is both players drifting towards the ball-side halfspace. This allows for improved combination play in those wide areas that Liverpool began to focus on more, and an even more aggressive counterpress if the ball is lost. It can cause chaos against man- or zonal-focused systems, and produced Liverpool’s best performance of the season as they thrashed Villa 6-0. Against a man-oriented system, the fluidity of movement creates a natural difficult challenge for defenders to constantly react to. Against systems with stricter zonal marking, it presents an opportunity to overload the zone and utilise combination play in a tight area.

      But this wide movement of the strikers must be compensated with movement from other players. This is something assistant manager Peter Krawietz had talked about previously when asked about the use of a ‘false nine’ (quote translated from his interview with SPOX in 2012):

      “It is possible that in case you break through on the wing, the centre is under-manned. This was observable in the Champions League semi-final between Barcelona and Chelsea. The Blues blocked the centre with eight or nine guys, and Barca could only break through the wings. But then in the middle, not enough happened. The advantage: you can turn it around.

      It is possible to occupy the centre flexibly and run into it with different players with high tempo movement, which deprives the oppositional centre backs of access. When the ball arrives, you can occupy the relevant spaces with many players, creating an ‘ambush’. That is clearly the positive aspect of this arrangement.”

      In the match against Aston Villa, James Milner was often the player tasked with occupying the opposition central defenders when Sturridge & Firmino both shifted away from that area. Lallana has been used in a similar way on occasions throughout the year, but it may also present some of the key reasoning for the signing of Sadio Mane, who operated in a similar way during his time at Southampton.

          Liverpool's "4-4-2" against Villa. No occupation of oppo CBs until Milner makes diagonal run. But lacks pace. Mane? pic.twitter.com/W9VZw3KPhc

          — Ed (@edAfootball) July 2, 2016

      He has the added advantage of lightning top speed, but Mane’s agility and acceleration is particularly outstanding. This means he can quickly adapt and adjust his movement to play, beating his direct opponent to the ball. As well as making him adept at occupying opposition central defenders, it also ensures he is a consistent threat in counterpressing situations. Mane’s manager in Salzburg, Roger Schmidt, famously utilised an alarm clock in training that went off five seconds after conceding possession if the ball was not yet regained.

      Mane’s time at Salzburg was spent mainly as an indented winger on the left of Schmidt’s flexible 4-4-2/4-2-2-2 system. Being able to adapt to the movement of his teammates was another key strength developed during this time. With such outstanding pace, it was often expected that Mane would focus only on making movements behind, but after a shift in play he provided a valuable passing option for combination play after indenting infield. Particularly when the strikers remain in their traditional advanced position, Mane is capable of combining with teammates in the ’10 space’ for spectacular results.
      Variable movement in Red Bull Salzburg’s 4-4-2: Mane often played a key role in combining play in the ten space, but also able to adapt to backwards movement from striker to make movement in behind defense himself.

      Variable movement in Red Bull Salzburg’s 4-4-2: Mane often played a key role in combining play in the ten space, but also able to adapt to backwards movement from striker to make movement in behind defense himself.

      These variable movements are a major strength of another rumoured Liverpool target: Mario Gotze. Despite the obvious differences in play-style and effect on the team, this key feature makes them both suitable as indented ‘wingers’ in a 4-2-2-2 system. There could still be a place for Gotze (or a similar player), who would have a massively positive impact on the team’s ability to re-structure in attacking organisation.

      In this way, Gotze presents a different profile to Liverpool incumbent Philippe Coutinho. The Brazilian provides valuable progression in early build-up phases, where he can dribble or make quick combination plays in the halfspace. But in attacking organisation, he finds it difficult to make consistently helpful movements, particularly with his back to goal. Gotze differs from this, whilst also being just as useful in early build-up due to his similarly high press resistance. He can make intelligent movements out of cover shadows, and more effectively adjust to his teammates and the opposition. This becomes particularly useful during a sideways shift in possession (such as the scene illustrated above) or when adjusting quickly to a new in-game situation.

      Firmino & Sturridge only started four more games together throughout the rest of the season, and Mario Gotze seems more likely to return to Dortmund. But the deadly potential of these personnel combinations suggest Liverpool may not be far away from something great. Particularly down the right side, where Sturridge naturally prefers to drift towards anyway, a number of dangerous combinations could be created.
      Conclusion

      With the arrival of managerial megastars Guardiola, Mourinho and Conte, the top of the Premier League may look very different next season. Leicester will hope to continue their outstanding form that led them to a Premier League title, and Arsenal & Tottenham will both provide serious challenges to the top four.

      Liverpool will have to improve to even be in contention. This improvement has been occurring consistently since Klopp’s arrival, and the addition of players over the Summer will provide valuable reinforcement. Klopp and his staff seem to have concocted a more suitable fitness regime for Daniel Sturridge, who has spent most of 2016 available. Many players with long-term injuries will also return to full fitness over the Summer and bolster the squad.

      After a disappointing loss in the Europa League final to Sevilla, Liverpool find themselves without European football for next year. This will significantly reduce the long-term fitness load on the players during the latter stages of the season. Of the other top Premier League teams, only Chelsea have a similar advantage.

      If the team can continue their progress and further advance their approach to fitness without the valuable winter break, then there is no reason Liverpool cannot take a major step next year.

      Big thanks again go to those who were happy to share data or other information for this article, be sure to make use of the links throughout this piece to access their respective Twitter accounts. Also thanks to @MC_of_A and @GoalImpact for providing additional data.

      http://spielverlagerung.com/2016/07/15/tactical-analysis-Jürgen-klopps-liverpool/
      KS67
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #696: Jul 16, 2016 05:51:51 pm
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      Team Analysis: Jürgen Klopp’s Liverpool

      von EA am 15.07.2016 in den Kategorien Europa League,Premier League,Team Portraits mit 0 Kommentaren

      The final day of the 2014-15 season saw Brendan Rodgers’ Liverpool side get thrashed 6-1 by a mediocre Stoke team. After challenging for the title in the previous season, the transfer of Luis Suarez and poor health of Daniel Sturridge created big issues and performance dropped off a cliff. Whilst Rodgers was previously able to rely on his talented personnel, he struggled to implement a consistent strategy from this point onwards. He was granted the start of the 2015-16 season to rectify the issues, but was unable to do so. He was sacked after a 1-1 draw with Everton in October. A few days later, Jürgen Klopp was hired.

      Klopp has already made a number of changes to the systems utilised under Rodgers, and Liverpool have shown many promising signs despite clear tactical and personnel issues.
      Pressing and counterpressing

      One major tool used by Jürgen Klopp is the infamous counterpress: attempting to regain possession immediately after losing it. Whilst Rodgers’ Liverpool were a high pressing team at their peak in 2013-14, this often came in established possession rather than actively focusing on recovering the ball immediately. But during 2014-15, the team even began to lose their focus on pressing itself as Rodgers found himself stuck between philosophies.

      Whilst the nuances of counterpressing can take many months to fully implement, Klopp was able to make immediate improvements.
      Progression of Liverpool’s counterpress over the 2015-16 Premier League season

      Progression of Liverpool’s counterpress over the 2015-16 Premier League season

      On Jürgen Klopp’s debut (game 9 of the season), Liverpool visited another team focused heavily on counterpressing, Mauricio Pochettino’s Tottenham. With less than a week of training, Klopp was already able to instill a few key principles of counterpressing into the team. Despite this, many of the suitable support structures were not in place to implement a successful post-counterpress transition (after only days of coaching, this is to be expected). This created a match with many individual duels and second balls, but little sustained possession or clean combination play.

      The general aggression of the counterpress was vastly increased, but more importantly, the triggers for counterpressing were seemingly more clearly defined than under Rodgers. The main signal for triggering an ultra-aggressive counterpress was the opponent receiving the ball with his back to [Liverpool’s] goal. This is the most common trigger in general, because makes it more difficult for the receiving ball-player to view or access the game behind him. It reduces his passing options and makes it easier for the ball to be regained. If the ball is not won back quickly, then it forces the opponent into a backwards pass and gives the team additional time to re-structure.

      Another core principle the players exhibited almost immediately was a more intense press in the wing area. This is simply because of the lack of connectivity to the other areas of the pitch.
      Fewer areas of the pitch are immediately accessible from the wing ([LINK]from TP’s Empoli team analysis[/LINK])

      Fewer areas of the pitch are immediately accessible from the wing (from TP’s Empoli team analysis)

      The simplicity of these instructions made it easy for the team to co-ordinate the press after little training time together, but they were not yet able to assess the situation for themselves or alter the intensity of the press. This meant that even if the team had poor initial pressing access, the midfield would still press aggressively without closing passing lanes, allowing Tottenham an easy route out.

          Liverpool on Klopp's debut: ultra-aggressive in flooding area around ball, but lacking structure for clean regain. pic.twitter.com/62HHcftKze

          — Ed (@edAfootball) June 14, 2016

      Klopp was quickly able to improve on these base rules. More complex principles were introduced, and the counterpress peaked around the turn of the year, despite an injury crisis. Perhaps the success would have been improved even further if the team did not (rightly or wrongly) prioritise their Europa League campaign over the Premier League.
      An example of a common early pressing trap: allowing the ball to return to the halfspace after it previously reached the wing.

      An example of a common early pressing trap: allowing the ball to return to the halfspace after it previously reached the wing.

      Around this time, the team began to introduce pressing and counterpressing traps based on the key taught principles. The most commonly used trap was to force the opposition into a wider area, and allow a single open passing lane into the halfspace. Based on the position of the ball, this player was forced to have an outwards-facing field of vision, and would be pressed heavily from all directions upon receiving the ball. Backwards pressing from the ball-side attacking midfielder played a key role in ensuring the opposition could not merely recycle possession.

      The specifics of the trap itself varied depending on the system used and opposition faced. For example, a less aggressive version of the same press may be to force a ball backwards to a central defender. If co-ordinated previously, this allows the central midfielder to aggressively press the opposition receiver. With sufficiently altered movement to close potential passing lanes, this can force a long ball forward.

      But the other key reason that Liverpool’s counterpress improved during the season was the preparation for the counterpress during the possession phase. As the year went on, many more of Liverpool’s attacks were forced to the wing.
      Percentage of all potential counterpress opportunities in the opposition half that occurred on the wing

      Percentage of all potential counterpress opportunities in the opposition half that occurred on the wing

      Whilst this can have disadvantages in attacking, it creates more stability if the ball is lost. With a strong central presence, it becomes much easier to defend transitions that start from the wing because of the reduced passing options the opposition immediately has.

      This increase was largely due to two connected reasons. Firstly, the emphasis of Liverpool’s attacks has gradually moved wider: in the first half of the Premier League season, no team completed a lower percentage of their opposition half passes on the wing. This improved to 13th in the league for the second half of the season.

      In facilitating this focus on wider possession, the team’s structure improved and began to focus more on utilising the halfspace as a means to attack rather than the centre itself. This was particularly the case in Klopp’s 4-3-2-1 shape, where both the attacking midfielders and outside central midfielders would spend much of their time in the halfspace (with license to drift wide depending on the movements and positioning of their teammates).

      This increased focus on the halfspace had a big effect on attacking midfielders Firmino & Lallana, but neither were the very best contributor…
      Individual counterpressing contributions, and effect on the team's ability to regain possession quickly

      Individual counterpressing contributions, and effect on the team’s ability to regain possession quickly

      Initially brought in as the ‘Welsh Xavi’, Allen has found himself without a defined role at post-Rodgers Liverpool. Injury troubles have contributed to a lack of consistent starts, but even when fit Allen has struggled to start games regularly. There are questions about his physicality (or lack thereof) and how this can be a detriment in Klopp’s system, where second ball duels in tight spaces form a key part of a midfielder’s role.

      Despite this, his contributions to the counterpress when he does feature are unparalleled. In general pressing phases, his contribution to regaining possession is more indirect: closing passing lanes and adjusting to his teammates’ movements with intelligent decision making. Within the counterpress, his ability to regain the ball himself is magnified due to his impressive in-possession positioning. Particularly when the ball reaches the final third, it is rare that Allen is more than one pass away. This allows him to easily shift towards the opposition, or aggressively close the ball-player if the situation demands.

      As the outer central midfielder in the 4-3-2-1, he was given license to make extreme vertical movements forward. In advanced positions, he provides good value in stabilising possession with good decision-making. If a quick combination play is available, then he facilitates this with quick feet, but also understands when the tempo needs to be reduced. This general game intelligence is perhaps one of the reasons he makes such an impact as a sub, and why his GoalImpact score is one of the highest in the Liverpool squad (2nd only to Jordan Henderson).
      Increasing horizontal compactness and ball-orientation

      Improved ball-oriented shifting was one of the key features that Klopp was able to implement into Liverpool’s press almost immediately. During Liverpool’s peak under Brendan Rodgers, there was often an aggressive initial press without suitable compactness and ball-orientation. This means if the opposition break the initial press with quick feet or a sharp pass, there is an immediate transition opportunity.

      When the ball is in the centre, Klopp’s team will often disregard the wing and focus almost entirely on defending the halfspaces and centre. Whilst the centre is occupied, the team’s forward is tasked with closing inside passing lanes and forcing the opposition towards the unoccupied wings. The most common example comes when one opposition central defender has the ball – Liverpool’s forward disallows the pass to the other central defender whilst his teammates occupy the centre.

      This was one of the primary strengths of the 4-3-2-1 shape that Klopp used many times throughout the season. Once the pass has been forced to the opposition full-back, Liverpool’s outside central midfielder can aggressively press whilst closing the inside passing lane. The ball-side attacking midfielder can then curve his movement to ensure the opposition cannot recycle possession through their central defenders.
      Liverpool's pressing shape in their 4-3-2-1, from RM's analysis of Klopp's Liverpool debut

      Liverpool’s pressing shape in their 4-3-2-1, from RM’s analysis of Klopp’s Liverpool debut

      The players developed more intelligence in adapting their pressing movements as the season developed. The win against eventual Premier League winners Leicester was particularly impressive due to Liverpool’s dominance of the transition phase (one of Leicester’s key strengths).

      Because of the compactness of the two teams, much of Leicester’s transitions came from trying to stretch the pitch into the previously vacant wide areas. This limited the influence of Leicester’s central midfielders, and consistently forced build-up through the full-backs. If the ball was quickly regained, then the team could attempt a transition. For the opposition to stay suitably structured in the chaos of this transition moment requires huge levels of co-ordination. In many instances, it will create some large spaces (and many smaller spaces) that Liverpool can immediately exploit with quick vertical passing and sharp combination play.

          Liverpool force build-up into wide areas, then attempt to quickly transition into the newly opened spaces. pic.twitter.com/3FYmwgZMxN

          — Ed (@edAfootball) July 10, 2016

      The role of the attacking midfielders (generally Lallana & Firmino in the 4-3-2-1) in these instances was particularly interesting. Many times, when Liverpool’s forward forced the ball wide, they would remain in an advanced position, ready to press the opposition ball-side central midfielder should the ball return into the centre of the pitch. This adds another dimension to the press that was sometimes vacant when the team pressed in a 4-2-3-1 shape.
      Backwards pressing

      The nature of their positioning generally meant that these players were pressing backwards, often outside the opponent’s immediate field of vision. Lallana in particular benefited most from an extended shift to the 4-3-2-1 during game 21 of the season. This improvement, and their role in particular, mainly came in the form of picking the pocket of the opponent with a tackle from behind. Firmino & Lallana had the highest percentage of their counterpressing recoveries come as tackles of all Liverpool players.

      Aside from the player curving his movement to stay ‘out of view’ of the ball-player, these tackles often necessitate slightly different body positioning to an ordinary tackle. With the ball on the other side of the opponent, there is more need for use of the upper body to disrupt the balance of the opponent. This slight push can create a split-second of disorientation for the ball-player, particularly if he was unaware of the approaching presser.

      Additionally, sometimes a small ‘hop’ immediately prior to making the tackle can give the tackler an advantage when tackling from behind. This small jump has the added benefit of avoid the shield that some players naturally use to protect the ball. When the opponent’s leg is extended, it clearly has to be at an angle because of the biomechanics of the hip joint. Making a slight hop over the leg (if it is extended in a shielding motion) allows less diversion of tackler’s movement, making it easier to reach the ball quickly.

      Another vital advantage of this downwards force (after the peak of the natural trajectory of a jump) is that it creates enough force for a tackle and pass to be made in one motion. Instead of making an additional movement with his leg, the player can use the force generated from the jump to deflect the ball to a teammate.

      For obvious reasons, this quickens the process and reduces the likelihood the tackler will immediately lose the ball again. When there is a suitable support structure around the ball, this can create dangerous transitions through the use of combination play and third man runs. Within the 4-3-2-1, the two attacking midfielders would ball-orient in an attempt to overload the nearby zone. When this is the case, the ‘third man’ can anticipate the regain of possession. This creates the opportunity for the player to ensure he is open for a pass from the recipient of the tackle-pass, allowing the ball to be quickly moved away.

          An example of Liverpool's backwards pressing into immediate combination play. pic.twitter.com/afRRxxiMwe

          — Ed (@edAfootball) July 10, 2016

      Firmino & Lallana were the primary proponents of such techniques. Coutinho had more difficulty achieving this; despite curving his movement suitably, his tackling positioning was often poor. This makes the Liverpool press more one-dimensional, and is perhaps one key reason why the team were much less effective at regaining the ball with Coutinho on the pitch, despite the fact he had a similar number of direct regains from counterpressing (0.81 per 90 minutes) to Firmino (0.82) and Lallana (0.94).
      Defensive transition issues

      Focusing on counterpressing rather than dropping deep to regain structure is an inherently aggressive tactic. Klopp’s system is focused more on quickly closing the space around the ball with large numbers of players converging from all directions. The upside, as mentioned previously, is that this can allow the team to quickly regain possession and even start its own attacks.

      The downside is that an aggressive counterpress from deep in midfield can allow the opposition more opportunity to transition if the initial press is beaten. This effect is magnified if the team prepares poorly for the counterpress when in-possession, and does not have good pressing access from all sides of the ball to immediately flood the new opposition ball-player.

      Liverpool suffered from this very effect in the latter stages of the season, particularly when James Milner was utilised in a double pivot with Emre Can. Despite joining Liverpool largely to play in central midfield, Milner spent much of his time situated anywhere but central midfield in these moments.
      Milner’s positioning moments before a deadly Dortmund transition leading to a goal

      Milner’s positioning moments before a deadly Dortmund transition leading to a goal

      Not only does this poor structure make it more difficult to attack effectively, but it makes quickly regaining possession a near-impossible task. With such poor pressing access, Dortmund can easily escape.

      Milner also exhibited one of the other key negative traits that caused issues for Liverpool midfielders: an over-reliance on situational man-marking. Despite largely using a zonal-based system, occasionally the central midfielders would push forward and aggressively pursue potential passing options. Because of their backwards-facing field of vision and tight pressure from behind, this makes a pass into those players less likely. But it also leaves a large open space behind.

      Midfield man-marking

      This was exploited by the opposition on a number of occasions during the season, but chiefly by Dortmund and Henrikh Mkhitaryan. A 2v2 man-marking of the midfielders can leave space for the opposition #10 to drop into the space behind Liverpool’s midfield and receive the ball. This was particularly effective when the opposition were attempting to build from wide, and the full-back could play a diagonal ball into the halfspace behind Milner & Can. The ball-player is able to quickly accelerate into a 1v1 duel because he receives the ball on the half-turn. This forces the ball-side central defender into a difficult position, and in the case of Sakho & Lovren (with their naturally aggressive tendencies), will generally choose to confront the ball-player. For a successful confrontation, the central defender is forced to simultaneously attempt to close the passing lane and apply pressure to the ball-player. With sharp movements in front and behind of the defender and constantly shifting passing lanes – this makes it a very difficult situation to defend.
      Build-up disconnects

      The other key area the opposition were able exploit consistently in transition was behind Alberto Moreno. In general, Liverpool’s left side defense was much more porous than their right, and much of this was because of passes made behind Moreno. Whilst Nathaniel Clyne was generally more conservative in his movement, Moreno often pushed forward on the left.

      Liverpool’s softer left side (graph from [LINK]@SaturdayonCouch[/LINK])

      Liverpool’s softer left side (graph from @SaturdayonCouch)
      Whilst this advanced positioning in itself is not a problem, it often created a disconnect in Liverpool’s build-up play during the early months of Klopp’s tenure. Mamadou Sakho was the main passing hub in early build-up during these games, and the impact of his vertical passing ability was lessened due to Moreno’s advanced positioning. Not only does this overly-advanced positioning make it more difficult to reach him in build-up, but it also gives the opposition opportunity to transition behind him. Intelligent positioning from the opposition winger can block the passing lane without dropping too deep to limit his transition threat.

      Sometimes this effect can also create more pressure for Liverpool’s midfielders. Because of the distance of the pass needed to reach Moreno, his direct opponent can comfortably leave more space to cover, as he will have more time to reach Moreno whilst the pass is in motion. This allows them to create a more horizontally compact midfield, and allows less space to receive the ball in midfield.

          Moreno too high in build-up, allows opposition winger to simultaneously cover him + pressure Coutinho. Easy counter. pic.twitter.com/hMdbUjd0B9

          — Ed (@edAfootball) July 2, 2016

      Despite his good top speed, he can also find it difficult to turn quickly to ensure his direct opponent is not a threat in transition. This is due to his tendency to face towards the opposition goal whilst Liverpool has the ball, meaning he has to turn whilst his opponent faces the Liverpool goal. If possession is lost, he then has to turn before sprinting backwards, giving his opponent a head start. Even if he is facing inwards towards play from the left sideline, he still has to make a half-turn whereas his opponent can immediately move forward. When positioned on the same horizontal space on the pitch, this can make it difficult for Moreno to recover.

      Once Moreno recovers, he is excellent at making tackles or recovering the ball whilst sprinting. It makes sense to utilise him in an advanced role, as this fits his skillset and the requirements of the team. But this can be fine-turned; simply by dropping slightly deeper in build-up, he could increase his influence and limit the opponent’s opportunity to transition behind him if the ball is lot.

      Instead of pushing Moreno deeper in build-up though, this issue was ‘solved’ by shifting Sakho into a wider role in early build-up with a central midfielder often dropping between the two central defenders. Being situated in this wider position allowed Sakho to consistently find Moreno whilst still making his incisive laser passes into central areas. But the different midfield shape had a negative effect on Liverpool’s build-up generally – where once Emre Can would sit, now there was only space.

      Of his two-man-midfield partners, neither are able to consistently add value to build-up play. Milner’s proclivity to move away from central areas means he can often only be accessed after a horizontal shift in play rather than from an immediate central pass. Whilst Jordan Henderson has improved his touch and passing ability, his off-ball movement in these phases can be negligible.

      This dependence on Emre Can & Mamadou Sakho for ball progression is not sustainable for obvious reasons. This lack of midfield occupation merely gives the opposition more opportunity to counter, much like when Moreno is too advanced. Liverpool’s attacking midfielders will often attempt to fill this space by dropping deeper, and sometimes this creates some reasonably successful rotations. On the right-side Milner’s forward movements could be harnessed to disrupt opposition man-orientations with Lallana dropping into the vacant space, receiving the ball from Clyne in the halfspace. However, these simple movements cannot be relied upon to consistently progress play against strong opposition.
      Offensive transitions and pass availability

      With different personnel, Liverpool’s general attacking transition play varies wildly. Daniel Sturridge spent much of the season injured, but his return had a profound effect on Liverpool’s ability to consistently shift play forwards at speed. This was primarily down to his proclivity to drift ball-side (and particularly to the right) in transition. Whilst this is a strategically worse position for combination play and possession structure, it has some key advantages in transition for a player such as Sturridge.

      With few opposition defenders back, drifting wide allows the opportunity for Sturridge to create a 1v1 in space. Once the ball is under control, an inward-facing field of vision gives view of the entire pitch. The lengthier nature of an ‘outlet’ pass in transition means there is also more time for the receiving player to alter his body positioning (and therefore his field of vision) whilst the pass is in motion than a standard, shorter pass.

      Less capable dribblers have a tendency to remain facing their own goal when receiving the ball in the centre of the pitch. Indeed, Benteke will largely receive the ball facing his own goal regardless of his location on the pitch. As the most advanced player, it makes sense to do this – a backwards-facing field of vision allows him to view his teammates as they catch up with play. But it creates a blindspot where the opposition can press. Whilst Sturridge can move his field of vision towards the centre of the pitch as the pass is in motion, he is able to view more reference points and make a more informed decision of play. All Sturridge’s teammates can only move forwards on one side of him, whereas they could flood forwards on either side of Benteke. This can make it even harder for the player receiving centrally to assess the situation and make a quick decision, which is vital to successful transitions.

      If teammates are not able to progress as quickly as play, Sturridge is capable of shielding the ball or utilising sharp dribbling movements to move beyond his opponent. This is again made easier by the 1v1 created as he drifts into a wider position. With the movement wide disrupting the opposition’s horizontal compactness in defense, even if a 1v1 is unsuccessful then onrushing teammates will have more room to operate if Sturridge can make a pass to them.

      Sturridge is not the only Liverpool player with a multi-dimension skillset in offensive transitions. Divock Origi has vastly improved his timing of runs in behind, and his new-found strength makes it easier for him to keep Premier League central defenders from slowing him down in a tight tussle. Sadio Mane provides a huge transition threat, and had been invaluable in these situations at Southampton & Salzburg. Sturridge’s inclination to drift wide benefits Mane’s preference to move beyond the strikers (with a preference of starting on the left and moving inside).

      Danny Ings missed much of the 2015/16 season with injury, but is one of the top transition forwards in the league. Much like Sturridge, he is capable of playing as the outlet or reacting to an initial break and offering immediate support, with a fast-paced movement into the centre.
      Top 20 players in terms of fast-attacking expected goals per 90 minutes over the past four Premier League seasons. Minimum 2,700 minutes played. Three Liverpool players feature. Graph courtesy of @WillTGM

      Top 20 players in terms of fast-attacking expected goals per 90 minutes over the past four Premier League seasons. Minimum 2,700 minutes played. Three 2016/17 Liverpool players feature – here comes the speed. (Graph courtesy of @WillTGM)

      Jürgen Klopp famously said that the counterpress is the best playmaker. Despite an improved counterpress, the quantity of Liverpool transitions from these situations has not dramatically increased. This is perhaps a downside of the ‘space-oriented’ counterpress that Klopp operates with – when the players do not fully understand the system, there tends to be an emphasis on aggression over structure. If the pressing movements are not staggered, then this leaves few potential passing options once possession is regained.

      This clean regain of possession improved in general pressing, particularly with the blind-side tackling from Lallana & Firmino. But there are still improvements to be made. Feeding off passes from second balls and broken possessions was also one key reason Gotze found such success in Klopp’s system at Dortmund…
      The Future: 4-4-2-0?

      It is clear that many improvements have been made since Jürgen Klopp’s arrival on Merseyside. In terms of counterpressing and general pressing structures, this team is now totally different than the one that started the season under Brendan Rodgers. There seems to be more focus on adapting the system to individual challenges & fixtures, rather than completely ditching a style or system after a few bad results.

      One such system that was only explored briefly throughout the season, was a 4-4-2/4-6-0 used against Aston Villa. This came immediately after the controversial Sunderland match (due to a fan walkout at ticket prices and Klopp missing the game due to illness) where Liverpool utilised a heavily rotating midfield to counter Sunderland’s emphasis on man-marking.
      Situation from the Aston Villa match, and how Milner could have adapted his positioning to occupy the opposition central defender.

      Situation from the Aston Villa match, and how Milner could have adapted his positioning to occupy the opposition central defender – perhaps with a more capable striker, even both central defenders could be occupied.

      Having utilised a 4-3-2-1/4-3-3 system against Sunderland and in recent matches, it was suggested the same would be used. Against Aston Villa, though, Liverpool were able to utilise Roberto Firmino & Daniel Sturridge at the same time for the very first time that season (25 league games in). The natural movements of both players are to drift from a traditional centre forward position.

      One such situation is both players drifting towards the ball-side halfspace. This allows for improved combination play in those wide areas that Liverpool began to focus on more, and an even more aggressive counterpress if the ball is lost. It can cause chaos against man- or zonal-focused systems, and produced Liverpool’s best performance of the season as they thrashed Villa 6-0. Against a man-oriented system, the fluidity of movement creates a natural difficult challenge for defenders to constantly react to. Against systems with stricter zonal marking, it presents an opportunity to overload the zone and utilise combination play in a tight area.

      But this wide movement of the strikers must be compensated with movement from other players. This is something assistant manager Peter Krawietz had talked about previously when asked about the use of a ‘false nine’ (quote translated from his interview with SPOX in 2012):

      “It is possible that in case you break through on the wing, the centre is under-manned. This was observable in the Champions League semi-final between Barcelona and Chelsea. The Blues blocked the centre with eight or nine guys, and Barca could only break through the wings. But then in the middle, not enough happened. The advantage: you can turn it around.

      It is possible to occupy the centre flexibly and run into it with different players with high tempo movement, which deprives the oppositional centre backs of access. When the ball arrives, you can occupy the relevant spaces with many players, creating an ‘ambush’. That is clearly the positive aspect of this arrangement.”

      In the match against Aston Villa, James Milner was often the player tasked with occupying the opposition central defenders when Sturridge & Firmino both shifted away from that area. Lallana has been used in a similar way on occasions throughout the year, but it may also present some of the key reasoning for the signing of Sadio Mane, who operated in a similar way during his time at Southampton.

          Liverpool's "4-4-2" against Villa. No occupation of oppo CBs until Milner makes diagonal run. But lacks pace. Mane? pic.twitter.com/W9VZw3KPhc

          — Ed (@edAfootball) July 2, 2016

      He has the added advantage of lightning top speed, but Mane’s agility and acceleration is particularly outstanding. This means he can quickly adapt and adjust his movement to play, beating his direct opponent to the ball. As well as making him adept at occupying opposition central defenders, it also ensures he is a consistent threat in counterpressing situations. Mane’s manager in Salzburg, Roger Schmidt, famously utilised an alarm clock in training that went off five seconds after conceding possession if the ball was not yet regained.

      Mane’s time at Salzburg was spent mainly as an indented winger on the left of Schmidt’s flexible 4-4-2/4-2-2-2 system. Being able to adapt to the movement of his teammates was another key strength developed during this time. With such outstanding pace, it was often expected that Mane would focus only on making movements behind, but after a shift in play he provided a valuable passing option for combination play after indenting infield. Particularly when the strikers remain in their traditional advanced position, Mane is capable of combining with teammates in the ’10 space’ for spectacular results.
      Variable movement in Red Bull Salzburg’s 4-4-2: Mane often played a key role in combining play in the ten space, but also able to adapt to backwards movement from striker to make movement in behind defense himself.

      Variable movement in Red Bull Salzburg’s 4-4-2: Mane often played a key role in combining play in the ten space, but also able to adapt to backwards movement from striker to make movement in behind defense himself.

      These variable movements are a major strength of another rumoured Liverpool target: Mario Gotze. Despite the obvious differences in play-style and effect on the team, this key feature makes them both suitable as indented ‘wingers’ in a 4-2-2-2 system. There could still be a place for Gotze (or a similar player), who would have a massively positive impact on the team’s ability to re-structure in attacking organisation.

      In this way, Gotze presents a different profile to Liverpool incumbent Philippe Coutinho. The Brazilian provides valuable progression in early build-up phases, where he can dribble or make quick combination plays in the halfspace. But in attacking organisation, he finds it difficult to make consistently helpful movements, particularly with his back to goal. Gotze differs from this, whilst also being just as useful in early build-up due to his similarly high press resistance. He can make intelligent movements out of cover shadows, and more effectively adjust to his teammates and the opposition. This becomes particularly useful during a sideways shift in possession (such as the scene illustrated above) or when adjusting quickly to a new in-game situation.

      Firmino & Sturridge only started four more games together throughout the rest of the season, and Mario Gotze seems more likely to return to Dortmund. But the deadly potential of these personnel combinations suggest Liverpool may not be far away from something great. Particularly down the right side, where Sturridge naturally prefers to drift towards anyway, a number of dangerous combinations could be created.
      Conclusion

      With the arrival of managerial megastars Guardiola, Mourinho and Conte, the top of the Premier League may look very different next season. Leicester will hope to continue their outstanding form that led them to a Premier League title, and Arsenal & Tottenham will both provide serious challenges to the top four.

      Liverpool will have to improve to even be in contention. This improvement has been occurring consistently since Klopp’s arrival, and the addition of players over the Summer will provide valuable reinforcement. Klopp and his staff seem to have concocted a more suitable fitness regime for Daniel Sturridge, who has spent most of 2016 available. Many players with long-term injuries will also return to full fitness over the Summer and bolster the squad.

      After a disappointing loss in the Europa League final to Sevilla, Liverpool find themselves without European football for next year. This will significantly reduce the long-term fitness load on the players during the latter stages of the season. Of the other top Premier League teams, only Chelsea have a similar advantage.

      If the team can continue their progress and further advance their approach to fitness without the valuable winter break, then there is no reason Liverpool cannot take a major step next year.

      Big thanks again go to those who were happy to share data or other information for this article, be sure to make use of the links throughout this piece to access their respective Twitter accounts. Also thanks to @MC_of_A and @GoalImpact for providing additional data.

      http://spielverlagerung.com/2016/07/15/tactical-analysis-Jürgen-klopps-liverpool/

      Thanks for posting, I really enjoyed reading that.

      Some interest ideas about next season. Bits and pieces to look out for.
      Scottbot
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #697: Jul 16, 2016 11:17:50 pm
      Cracking read Debs, this fella certainly knows his stuff! You can certainly get a feel for how much better we can be as a pressing side as the players get more and more comfortable with it and things become more and habitual. We saw this as the season progressed and with a full pre-season under his belt and of course more time in between matches I am sure we will see further improvements this year.
      trebor12
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #698: Jul 21, 2016 09:40:47 pm
      I think this Wijnaldum signing looks like we could be playing a 4 3 3 or a 4 3 2 1 this season..just a thought.
      Scottbot
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #699: Aug 22, 2016 08:36:16 am
      I've been thinking about WHY we seem to do so well against the bigger sides, particularly away from home and yet we struggle so much against the so called lesser teams. I've come to the conclusion that it's by and large the tactics that win us the game against the bigger sides and it's a lack of creative talent (and talent in general) that costs us against the lower teams. I look at the wins at Arsenal, at Chelsea, at City (plus others) and in every one of those games we have seen Jürgen's Gegenpress executed perfectly, we've won the ball high up the pitch, we've pretty much played with a false 9 every time, we've denied them time and space on the ball, really shortened the pitch and been clinical in front of goal. And in every game the opposition have kinda fell into the trap, they've tried to play through the thirds, to play their natural game, keep on the deck etc and its cost them.

      But against the bus-parkers there is a lack of ideas, a lack of creativity and IMHO there simply isn't quite the level of talent in the team. The club went out and bought Mane in the summer and early evidence suggests he was a cracking bit of business BUT he almost seems to be our most important player which is crazy. However, he is the ONLY wide player at the club (I'm not counting Lazar) so surely we need to be buying another one of similar ability and skill set? Up top we have got a couple of talented players in Studge and Origi no doubt about it but Origi is still largely unproven and Studge is always a moment away from tweaking another toe nail. Ings is an honest player but he is one who needs it put on a plate for him, not the sort who will make things happen against an 8 man defence. And in midfield we're simply dysfunctional, a bunch of 7/10 performers who are desperately in need of a supreme player who can and will grab a game by the scruff of the neck and in turn lift their performances too. Problem is we don't have that player. And defensively again it comes back to talent, I'm desperately hoping Matip can be that dominant ball winning centre-half we need so desperately because I don't see us winning too many 1 nils at the moment.

      I can see us going to Spurs and getting a win at the weekend I really can, but then I wouldn't be surprised to see us lose at Watford or at home to Hull later on the season either.
      reddebs
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #700: Nov 07, 2016 02:24:56 pm
      I wasn't sure whether to resurrect this thread or start a new one but for now it's in here.

      Last season and also at the start of this one, it was noted that we tried to force things in the attacking phase.  That we'd take shots instead of passing and vice versa, therefore not score when we really needed to.  The Burnley game this season and the EL final last season come to mind.

      This seems to have been eradicated and we're now scoring freely and almost at will.  Jürgen has clearly drummed it into his players that what they're practicing day in day out works, that the opportunities will come by being patient and waiting for the openings instead of panic setting in and snatching at things.

      The midfield also seems to have improved on everything.  The positional play, the passing, the possession, the knowing where team mates are, when to pass, where to pass, whereas there was always that bit of panic and players getting in each others way and causing unnecessary problems.  We can work through, round or over the press if a team dares to press us, something that we were still struggling with until a few weeks ago.

      Although some are still concerned with the lack of clean sheets and the defense generally, there's still been huge improvements in certain parts of it.  We're preventing a lot of 1v1s, we're preventing more crosses, free kicks and corners but on some occasions the panic is still there which results in those crazy individual mistakes.

      The work on improving the defense is starting to take shape but the calmness and organisation still needs some work.  We still have moments where too many cooks spoil the broth, get in each others way, cause panic and instead of the ball being cleared simply and easily it turns into a game of pinball and the inevitable goal against is scored.

      As I posted earlier in the "clean sheet" thread, the 5 at the back are still learning each others game.  They've barely played together regularly but when, as with the other parts of our game, they start to believe what they're practicing works, those clean sheets will come.

      This team/squad hasn't properly got going yet, as Jürgen said yesterday, they've still a lot of development and improvements to come but it is nicely coming together, right across the pitch.

       

      biki
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #701: Nov 10, 2016 03:29:58 pm
      I wasn't sure whether to resurrect this thread or start a new one but for now it's in here.

      Last season and also at the start of this one, it was noted that we tried to force things in the attacking phase.  That we'd take shots instead of passing and vice versa, therefore not score when we really needed to.  The Burnley game this season and the EL final last season come to mind.

      This seems to have been eradicated and we're now scoring freely and almost at will.  Jürgen has clearly drummed it into his players that what they're practicing day in day out works, that the opportunities will come by being patient and waiting for the openings instead of panic setting in and snatching at things.

      The midfield also seems to have improved on everything.  The positional play, the passing, the possession, the knowing where team mates are, when to pass, where to pass, whereas there was always that bit of panic and players getting in each others way and causing unnecessary problems.  We can work through, round or over the press if a team dares to press us, something that we were still struggling with until a few weeks ago.

      Although some are still concerned with the lack of clean sheets and the defense generally, there's still been huge improvements in certain parts of it.  We're preventing a lot of 1v1s, we're preventing more crosses, free kicks and corners but on some occasions the panic is still there which results in those crazy individual mistakes.

      The work on improving the defense is starting to take shape but the calmness and organisation still needs some work.  We still have moments where too many cooks spoil the broth, get in each others way, cause panic and instead of the ball being cleared simply and easily it turns into a game of pinball and the inevitable goal against is scored.

      As I posted earlier in the "clean sheet" thread, the 5 at the back are still learning each others game.  They've barely played together regularly but when, as with the other parts of our game, they start to believe what they're practicing works, those clean sheets will come.

      This team/squad hasn't properly got going yet, as Jürgen said yesterday, they've still a lot of development and improvements to come but it is nicely coming together, right across the pitch.

       



      Summed up perfectly.

      The defence will come in time, with Klopp its not just five players responsible, its the whole team defending from the front and that maybe takes a bit longer.

      At the end of the day I'd rather be scoring freely but be conceding too many than keeping clean sheets but not able to do anything at the other end.
      Scottbot
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #702: Jan 29, 2017 09:00:44 pm
      Obviously it's not been a good month for the Reds, in fact a loss on Tuesday at home to Chelsea and i don't think I will be able to recall a worse run of results in quite some time. Understandably there has been a fair bit of anger and criticism but much of it has been without suggestion of how we should change things tactically to pull us out of this tail spin. I'be got my own thoughts but would be interested to hear what others think the manager should do?
      HScRed1
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #703: Jan 29, 2017 09:26:04 pm
      Obviously it's not been a good month for the Reds, in fact a loss on Tuesday at home to Chelsea and i don't think I will be able to recall a worse run of results in quite some time. Understandably there has been a fair bit of anger and criticism but much of it has been without suggestion of how we should change things tactically to pull us out of this tail spin. I'be got my own thoughts but would be interested to hear what others think the manager should do?

      With the return of Mane we will soon be back with the 3 most potent forward players in the league and probably just as importantly get Lallana back into midfield.

      In the abscene of Mane various systems have been tried and none have really worked so let's get back to what was successful previously which means Danny and Divock on the bench and Firmino playing centrally.

      With Lallana back in midfield it also means Gini has more licence to make the late runs into the box which may not have resulted in goals but creates a lot of confusion for opposition defenders.

      Fingers crossed  :)

      KopiteLuke
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #704: Jan 29, 2017 09:39:44 pm
      Obviously it's not been a good month for the Reds, in fact a loss on Tuesday at home to Chelsea and i don't think I will be able to recall a worse run of results in quite some time. Understandably there has been a fair bit of anger and criticism but much of it has been without suggestion of how we should change things tactically to pull us out of this tail spin. I'be got my own thoughts but would be interested to hear what others think the manager should do?

      Firstly I think Origi has dodged a lot of the criticism that could have been vented upon him. I think the moving of Firmino from the middle is the first mistake and then the continuation of this in bringing in Sturridge exacerbated it. We lose so much of our fluidity and space creation when Firmino isn't the tip of the spear that I feel even when he isn't in goal scoring form he's still bringing much more to the side than someone who is. That will sound strange and at odds with those that like to purely judge on goals per game ratio but for me Firmino has been, or at least close to, our best player all season.

      Secondly I think moving Lallana from the midfield role to keep the shape and bring in Can is also looking a poor choice. Emre has done nothing to suggest his form has improved and only 1 game in recent memory has he played very well. These two mistakes have led to us looking far more pedestrian in possession not through lack of pace but lack of movement and quick thinking. Our attacks are meant to be dynamic and we need to regain that and to do so it requires players who are intelligent enough to play for others as much as themselves. The vital cogs in our team when it comes to this are Firmino, Coutinho, Lallana. As much as Mane has been missed, I don't think his role in the side is as vital as people have tried to sell.

      Once we get back to these 3 being our key players in possession then the pieces around them will simply dance to their tune. Formation is one thing but dynamism can be in any formation and it's something that is so difficult to coach and so difficult to explain, sometimes it's just a movement of a yard that unlocks an entire defence but knowing to move that yard appears to be something you either have or don't, you rarely see someone develop it.
      TheleftpegofRayKennedy
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #705: Jan 29, 2017 10:21:00 pm
      Firstly I think Origi has dodged a lot of the criticism that could have been vented upon him. I think the moving of Firmino from the middle is the first mistake and then the continuation of this in bringing in Sturridge exacerbated it. We lose so much of our fluidity and space creation when Firmino isn't the tip of the spear that I feel even when he isn't in goal scoring form he's still bringing much more to the side than someone who is. That will sound strange and at odds with those that like to purely judge on goals per game ratio but for me Firmino has been, or at least close to, our best player all season.

      Secondly I think moving Lallana from the midfield role to keep the shape and bring in Can is also looking a poor choice. Emre has done nothing to suggest his form has improved and only 1 game in recent memory has he played very well. These two mistakes have led to us looking far more pedestrian in possession not through lack of pace but lack of movement and quick thinking. Our attacks are meant to be dynamic and we need to regain that and to do so it requires players who are intelligent enough to play for others as much as themselves. The vital cogs in our team when it comes to this are Firmino, Coutinho, Lallana. As much as Mane has been missed, I don't think his role in the side is as vital as people have tried to sell.

      Once we get back to these 3 being our key players in possession then the pieces around them will simply dance to their tune. Formation is one thing but dynamism can be in any formation and it's something that is so difficult to coach and so difficult to explain, sometimes it's just a movement of a yard that unlocks an entire defence but knowing to move that yard appears to be something you either have or don't, you rarely see someone develop it.

      Spot on that, Luke.  I for one was thinking we needed to fit Sturridge in somehow, but recent evidence suggests it's just not going to work out.  Impact sub now.  You're right about Emre, though.  I don't like to see our lads cop it for a general run of poor team form, but he seems to just not fit the 'dynamic' model you're referring to in any way shape or form.  Not quite sure what he's there to do when he plays. 
      Scottbot
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #706: Jan 30, 2017 10:34:20 pm
      I think it's very clear that Jürgen has his work cut out for him from a tactical standpoint given that we are unlikely to sign anyone in the window and we're enduring just about the worst calendar month in I don't know how long, a loss tomorrow night would probably put it up there as the worst I can recall in some time. So something has to give, either he changes the shape, the players or the way we are playing.

      Some of our issues as I see them:

      - Teams are sitting ridiculously deep, it's not just the back four but their midfield is sitting virtually on top of them so it has become very difficult to play between the lines. The opposition are literally daring us to play through them or to get it wide and cross the ball. We haven't managed to do either.

      - We are sending too many players forward. You can guarantee that by the 8th-10th pass of an LFC attack that both our full-backs will be high and wide, our defensive line will be getting close to their final third and most of our midfield will be level or beyond the ball.

      - When we do inevitably lose the ball it's too easy for the opposition. Gegenpress is all about winning the ball back quickly when you lose it and always being superior in transition. Some have questioned whether our lads are simply knackered and there might be some truth in that but I just think it's too easy for the oppo to slip the press. We commit so many forward that they only need to make one or two passes and they are well and truly in the clear with the whole pitch to work with. We keep falling into the same trap.

      - Another problem with sending so many players forward is that they are sitting on each others toes and making an already crowded area even more busy.

      Some solutions (maybe!)

      - Either we have to move the ball forward more quickly OR we need to commit less players forward when we do have it. This might mean keeping a full back in or better still, ask our narrow front three to play wider (even if it isn't their natural game). This would enable the full-backs to make their runs later. At the moment we rely on our full backs to provide all of the width, even with Mane coming back we need to be less reliant on Milner on the other side.

      - Improve our final third movement when Coutinho is on the ball. Opposing defences she...t themselves when he gets the ball onto his right foot within 25 yards of goal. They all key on it, look at the effort defenders make to close the shot down. We need to take advantage of that, whether it's its with a ball inside their left back for Clyne to run onto or a reverse pass going he other way it's something I would be looking to take advantage of.

      - We need more two on ones in wide areas. There's no point in crossing the frickin ball, we're not great at it and it's meat and drink to most EPL defences. Look at the way Arsenl play, when they get it wide they look to attack the box and the cut the ball back for on rushing midfielders to score. We should be doing the same thing, the middle is so packed and we keep losing the ball and getting turned around. We have to do better out. Wide but you can't create two on ones if your wide-forwards don't get wide enough for your full backs to provide the overlap.

      - As for who should play in the number 9 shirt, I'm a fan of Firmino in the position but long-term I really think we need a better striker. We need a player who is good enough for us NOT to need to send so many players forward when we have the ball because that will help us defensively (in terms of our shape) when we do lose the ball.
      « Last Edit: Jan 30, 2017 10:53:12 pm by Scottbot »
      Danzel
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #707: Aug 23, 2017 01:16:18 am
      I was wondering, as many as you were, as to why Klopp persisted with Moreno and Lovren during the Hoffenheim game and why he didn't make any changes. I started reading a lot and came across a brilliant piece of analysis by BabuYagu (RAWK-poster). All credit goes to him. It's a long read, but it's worth it.

      "Firstly, that is one of the best drilled sides I have seen in attacking play. They constantly found ways to create underloads on our right and then switch to overloads on our left - ironically the thing I was tipping us to do this season with our two pacey inside forwards.

      Their build up play, for example, would drag Salah out of position. Then when a midfielder stepped into that area of the pitch the rest of our midfield narrowed and shifted across. This created a huge hole all night in front of Lovren & Moreno and they exploited this time and again.

      At least - that's what I felt when I first saw the game.

      I then went back and looked at some of it again and realised Klopp just let it happen. I know that is a really weird thing to suggest but if you look at how strong we make our right side and weak we make our left by comparison you have to conclude that we are actually doing it, by choice. Also we direct all traffic down that weaker left side. That's weird too right, but go back and watch any 5 minute segment of the game again and watch how players curve their pressing runs right to curve left, this naturally turns opponents to our left side to play.

      Now, something that can hold people back from better understanding football is pre-conceived opinions and ideas about certain things and players. The end result is you look for evidence to support what you think rather than look at the whole picture with no theory to prove. So I want you all to bin those things you believe to be true about Liverpool and certain players for the time being. The reason being I want us to collectively arrive at some answers to make sense of what Klopp was doing, because I was somewhat baffled. I don´t mean that in a negative way in that his choices make no sense like Hodgson, I mean that tactically there was a lot of very very high level tactical things happening in that game which will easily just pass over your head unless you are looking out for them.

      I personally know just enough to know that all the simplistic conclusions we arrive about certain players today are, in the main, wrong. (e.g. Bobby doesn't score enough, Lovren & Moreno are liabilities). I also know enough to be able to ask the right questions that might help us find the right answers. But more than anything else, I know enough to know that game was a tactical masterclass from two sides, most of which will have gone right over my head. I did see some things that I will share with you and hopefully others will have spotted some things to help us fill in the blanks.

      First of all - I think we we don't want to be attacked down our right flank and over compensate for that to discourage it from happening. One possible reason could be that Klopp mentions in the press multiple times how weak TAA is defensively makes me wonder exactly how true that is and to what extent we are minimizing his work defensively? 

      But then if you look at last season, Milner got through almost twice as much work defensively as Clyne also and I am sure nobody would suggest Clyne is a weak full back defensively that needs protecting. Therefore I believe this is our first pressing trap. Klopp did the same at Dortmund, creating a hole in his formation on one side of the pitch, staggering his formation around it and then ambushing the ball as soon as it was played in that area.

      If you put aside any opinions on our players for a minute and just look at this tactically. Just look at what we did and ask why.



      This is really interesting for example. Most believe Moreno is a liability, and yet we get Mane to offer him literally no support at all. Look at Mane v Kaderábek (RWB) on our left compared to Salah v Zuber (LWB) on our right. It was very clear watching the game that Salah would stay goal side of Zuber all night and not let him get at TAA. Therefore there was never an overload on TAA on that side. This was especially weird because Zuber is right footed. If you want any wing back to have time on the ball it would be the inverted one who is likely to come back in on his weak foot, or play floated, aimless left football balls into the box. I semi expected us to direct traffic down our right for that reason and yet we did the exact opposite. We both weakened the left side by leaving Mane high and wide against Bicakcic (their RCB). We also directed all attacks down that weaker side.

      We did this by congesting play on the right to such an extent that attacking our left was the only viable option. Therefore the most common pattern of the game was for them to slowly attack down our right, wait for our midfield to filter across gradually, and then switch to Kaderábek who stayed as wide as possible to either always be free for a switch or, when Moreno shifted across to negate this, would leave a huge hole in the left half space between Lovren and Moreno for someone (Either Rupp, Gnabry or Kramaric) to attack. In the end (probably by Klopp's instruction) he kept his starting position narrow to minimise the impact of those runs off the back of Lovren. So while the heat maps for the game will be more to the right side, it's quite misleading as in reality, all their attacks happened on the left.

      Regardless of your feelings on individual players, it's clear we decided to overload Lovren and Moreno, not Hoffenheim. Hoffenheim didn't leave Mane high up the pitch and Salah deep protecting TAA. When the a midfielder shifted up the pitch to press - we narrowed and protected the right, not the left where we just left a hole. That has to be a tactical decision, right? So Can and Salah both screened brilliantly in front of TAA. Moreno had no support at all from anybody all night. And it's easy to see and make a tactical shift to prevent it, Klopp chose not to. Which means he wanted it to happen. Why? I have no idea. It's incredibly risky and placing an exceptionally large amount of faith in Lovren and Moreno to sort that out between them.



      My instinct after the game also was that man of the match was Mane. He murdered Bicakcic all night long. But then it's now quite easy to see why Mane was man of the match. He had no defensive responsibility at all. His only job last night was to stay high up the pitch and destroy Bicakcic all night. He did that perfectly but we do tend to focus on positive attacking play when making a call for man of the match so clearly Mane was always going to be that guy based on the tactical decisions we made. He was excellent though and showed once again why he would be handful for any side to have to deal with. As much as we left their RWB to exploit our left side, the likewise didn't pull him back to watch Mane at any point during the game either. So both sides were willing to take a risk on that side of the pitch.

      Risk vs Reward



      I therefore propose that the above was the ultimate goal of Klopp last night. He accepted the that Hoffenheim are a good side and attack in numbers. He accepted they would get chances against us and therefore tried to have an element of control over where and what type of chances Hoffenheim could create. He tried to control where they would have their underloads and overloads. We can infer this by the tactical decisions of Mane, Salah, the midfield 3 & Moreno. The boxes above on the heat map are the consequence of our tactics. 

      White: Basically the white square is the area of the pitch we wanted them to have no attacks in. We put a wall up in front of the box here that they found almost impermeable. Ironically, their goal came from the one time we allowed them any space here at all which does in a way support this theory that this area was the most important part of the pitch to protect.

      Black: The black square is the "zone of death". It´s the area of the pitch that has the most possession won by Liverpool in any specific area (the image on the right is all Liverpool possession wins) and also had the least touches by a Hoffenheim player in comparison. This is the pressing trap I referred to before. Anything into this left half space we ambushed hard and aggressive to win the ball and set Mane away.

      Red: The red squares is the risk vs reward. We accepted they would have some success on our left due to leaving Mane up field and our midfield shifting right. However, we banked on Mane being far more dangerous attacking them in their red square compared to them attacking ours and this proved to be the case. It was a very ballsy strategy by Klopp but with away goals being so valuable, it's clearly a risk he was willing to accept for the reward of some away goals to take back to Anfield. I suspect he won't be so adventurous in the home leg.



      Their player who actually impressed me most was Demirbay. I loved how Hoffenheim used a different runner each time off the back of Lovren. That is really hard to adjust to because, for example, if Kramaric is the one attacking behind Lovren, Lovren starts instinctively looking for him on the pitch and making sure he can always see him. But Kramaric, Rupp & Gnabry were all taking turns to make that run and they set it up in different ways each time too. Demirbay was always the one who would find those runs with some quick passing or switch passes. He also put in a huge shift defensively too. I worried about the Gnabry-Kramaric-Rupp-Demirbay four in the middle of the pitch defensively. They are all more attack minded than defence and thought without a proper six behind them we would expose them here, but we never really did. Not sure whether that was a failing of our midfield in terms of creativity (we miss Lallana hard!) or just good play by Demirbay & Rupp... I suspect a little of both. I did call Demirbay as the key man before the game and he was every bit as dangerous as I feared - although we didn't really see his direct free kicks and long range shooting - yet.



      A word on Mignolet. I was worried before the game that the Migs who ended the game on Saturday would be the Migs who started this one looking a little rattled to say the least. But he was excellent. I have seen people discredit that penalty save but I remember a goalkeeper once saying that the easy penalty saves are usually a result of bravery to stand up and not make the penalty taker's mind up for him. If the taker is running up to the ball waiting for the keeper to move first, he ends up fluffing the penalty if the keeper stands tall. So well done Mr Mignolet and he built a very confidence performance on that moment of bravery.



      I want to end talking a little about Trent Alexander-Arnold. I thought he was excellent last night. I am starting to realise more and more we don't need Clyne. He's an outstanding defensive full back who can attack if needed, playing in a system which probably doesn't need one. Throughout last season and the beginning of this one, it´s clear we encourage attacks down our left side where we position our most aggressive defenders to attack the ball and launch counters. Lallana is usually on the right who is excellent at pressing play away from his side of the pitch. Gini on the left of midfield is probably our best transitions player in the squad who will be the midfielder to either initiate turnovers or launch counter on that side of the pitch. This would also make sense why Keita was targeted even more as in terms of tackles, interceptions and recoveries he is world class and does everything at high pace. He would be a perfect transition player for us on the left of midfield.

      Therefore TAA's defensive weaknesses that Klopp mentions are rarely exposed. Last night for example, he was beaten a few times and was responsible for our goal in the relatively small number of times he was exposed but he offers us so much going forward that makes that an acceptable risk to take. He beat his man four times down the left side of the pitch yesterday for example. To put that into perspective, Mane averaged 2.5 completed dribbles per game last season on that side of the pitch. And this is important because against a low block, attacking defenders with the ball and committing them to an action is the best way to break it down. Especially with full backs as it´s a run from a deeper area, coming in at an angle and leaves the better attacking players free to move off him into the space his dribble creates. He created 2 goalscoring opportunities at the weekend against Watford, for example. To put that into perspective, Mane was averaging 1.6 chances created per game last season.

      That doesn't mean I am advocating we get rid of Clyne or that he shouldn't be first choice now. More that how you can see in our system someone like TAA will be far more useful to us than Clyne in the long run. Once he gets his defensive game to the level Klopp seems to have set for him, I suspect we'll see him become a permanent fixture in the side. Exciting times for the kid."

      Credit to BabuYagu - RAWK-poster

      ---------------------------------------------------------------

      Thought it might make for some interesting discussion regarding Lovren, Moreno and Wijnaldum. In the Moreno player thread I posted another post by BabuYagu with more information on Moreno and the way he plays / why Klopp played / plays him.
      « Last Edit: Aug 23, 2017 01:48:18 am by Danzel »
      KopiteLuke
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #708: Aug 23, 2017 01:48:16 am
      Therefore TAA´s defensive weaknesses that Klopp mentions are rarely exposed. Last night for example, he was beaten a few times and was responsible for our goal in the relatively small number of times he was exposed but he offers us so much going forward that makes that an acceptable risk to take. He beat his man four times down the left side of the pitch yesterday for example. To put that into perspective, Mane averaged 2.5 completed dribbles per game last season on that side of the pitch. And this is important because against a low block, attacking defenders with the ball and committing them to an action is the best way to break it down. Especially with full backs as it´s a run from a deeper area, coming in at an angle and leaves the better attacking players free to move off him into the space his dribble creates. He created 2 goalscoring opportunities at the weekend against Watford, for example. To put that into perspective, Mane was averaging 1.6 chances created per game last season.

      That doesn´t mean I am advocating we get rid of Clyne or that he shouldn't be first choice now. More that how you can see in our system someone like TAA will be far more useful to us than Clyne in the long run. Once he gets his defensive game to the level Klopp seems to have set for him, I suspect we'll see him become a permanent fixture in the side. Exciting times for the kid."

      What an excellent post, absolutely top quality that.

      Highlighted the above part simply because I didn't shut up banging on about this all last season, when we heard over and over about how we struggle to break down the bus parkers. Full-backs always become the outlet and the reliance on their attacking prowess is greatly magnified. Those who defended Clyne, that "this wasn't part of his role" couldn't be further from the truth and it's one of the key reasons why Trent is already ahead of Nat.

      The interesting part is how he demonstrates our propensity to 'allow' their more dangerous attacks to develop on our left in exchange for a closed door on the right. I disagree to some extent regarding this because this is where I was furious at Can and Wijnaldum, their transitional play and ability to track/catch men who ran off them was horrific in this game. I think he's giving either Jürgen's gambling skills too much credit or ignoring the deficiencies that our midfield had having not practised too much together and their current form. Jürgen would have changed things if he had a natural 6 to put into the game in my opinion, had Lucas been still at the club I think he'd have changed it at half-time. Thankfully in the second half, no doubt with the interjection of Jürgen, some of our midfielders came out in better form, still not good enough and hopefully tonight we'll see a totally different animal in the centre of the park for us, given that we've had all this time to adapt to life without Phil.

      Even still, with those disagreements accepted, I still think that's a fantastic piece of work, cheers for sharing (nice to see him take a swipe at the Bobby nay-sayers too :D )
      Danzel
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #709: Aug 23, 2017 01:59:34 am
      The interesting part is how he demonstrates our propensity to 'allow' their more dangerous attacks to develop on our left in exchange for a closed door on the right. I disagree to some extent regarding this because this is where I was furious at Can and Wijnaldum, their transitional play and ability to track/catch men who ran off them was horrific in this game. I think he's giving either Jürgen's gambling skills too much credit or ignoring the deficiencies that our midfield had having not practised too much together and their current form. Jürgen would have changed things if he had a natural 6 to put into the game in my opinion, had Lucas been still at the club I think he'd have changed it at half-time. Thankfully in the second half, no doubt with the interjection of Jürgen, some of our midfielders came out in better form, still not good enough and hopefully tonight we'll see a totally different animal in the centre of the park for us, given that we've had all this time to adapt to life without Phil.

      No need to agree with all of it of course. Just trying to get a little discussion going other than the discussions with regards to our lack of transfers / transfer rumours. Thinking back about the game and looking back at the highlights, you do see a lot of what he is saying in his post. All he did was describe the tactics and the ideas behind the way we played. Wether the execution by both Can and Wijnaldum was good enough, is an other discussion. In a post he made later he did also refer to playing a 6 or even two 6's in front of our back four late in the second half to help shield our defence, so you are right about that part.

      Trent is indeed a very exiting prospect and I think most would agree with you. After seeing attack after attack break down last season whenever we played the ball to Clyne in the final third, it's a welcome change to have someone there who actually does have the offensive skillset to do something with it. Hopefully he will also develop his defensive side of the game well and we'll have an absolute top RB for years to come.
      KopiteLuke
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #710: Aug 23, 2017 02:04:36 am
      No need to agree with all of it of course. Just trying to get a little discussion going other than the discussions with regards to our lack of transfers / transfer rumours. Thinking back about the game and looking back at the highlights, you do see a lot of what he is saying in his post. All he did was describe the tactics and the ideas behind the way we played. Wether the execution by both Can and Wijnaldum was good enough, is an other discussion. In a post he made later he did also refer to playing a 6 or even two 6's in front of our back four late in the second half to help shield our defence, so you are right about that part.

      Perhaps I worded it wrongly Danzel, I agreed with the tactics he was highlighting (quite brilliantly to be fair) just that Can's and Gini's execution of this was terrible in the game. There's no way Jürgen was willing to give the amount of space these two afforded and I do hear you that this is a separate discussion but is also integral to his point.

      We'll see, but I suspect our 'trap' may be a bit smaller in the home game tonight. Certainly fair how he highlights the fact that Mane was set up to be successful as much as by tactical design as it was to do with individual talent.
      Danzel
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #711: Aug 23, 2017 02:22:57 am
      Perhaps I worded it wrongly Danzel, I agreed with the tactics he was highlighting (quite brilliantly to be fair) just that Can's and Gini's execution of this was terrible in the game. There's no way Jürgen was willing to give the amount of space these two afforded and I do hear you that this is a separate discussion but is also integral to his point.

      We'll see, but I suspect our 'trap' may be a bit smaller in the home game tonight. Certainly fair how he highlights the fact that Mane was set up to be successful as much as by tactical design as it was to do with individual talent.

      My bad, misunderstood you then. I do agree with you though, sometimes the spaces were just too big, but the idea behind it, is quite brilliant. Looking back at it, that game was tactical masterclass by both managers, even more so by our own, who some say is more of a man-manager than tactically astute. Of course he also has Bucav and Krawietz to work with, both brilliant coaches.

      This is our pressing from the Crystal Palace game, very similar with the Hoffenheim one:



      "Firstly, looking at the heatmap you can see that, once again, we pushed traffic down our left once again in the direction of the arrows. The demilitarized zone - i.e. The large area enclosed in black lines - contained 0 defensive actions as we aimed to simply push the play into areas we wanted rather than win the ball back here. This makes sense also as Firmino -> Milner -> Robertson would be a tougher line to play through than Sturridge -> Gini -> Gomez.

      The center of the pitch is always a hotspot in terms of defensive actions, particularly recoveries & interceptions obviously as its the area a lot of aimless passes and clearances end up in. However, three distinct hotspots could also be seen.

      Hotspot 1 - Tackles near the point of the arrow, interceptions & recoveries in the hotspot. I suspect this is where a lot of the misplaced/rushed passes ended up as a result of our pressure higher up the pitch on that side. Klavan 7 actions, Robertson 6, Henderson 4, Firmino 2, Gomez & Solanke 1. This looks like the main pressing trap as the very high numbers are the 3 players who surrounded this zone. Surprised to see no Milner though, maybe he was the one doing the pressing higher up with Bobby that resulted in the misplaced passes here.

      Hotspot 2 - Almost entirely interceptions and recoveries here. This is an area a lot of Palace attacks ended. Gomez 5 Matip & Bobby 4 Mane & Milner 2, Gini 1. I suspect this is an area a lot of cleared setpieces landed in given the high numbers for both Bobby & Mane in this area.

      Hotspot 3 - The end of the demilitarized zone marks another hotspot as we draw a line in the sand letting them know they must turn right here or be engaged. Hendo 5, Gomez 4, Salah & Matip 3, Bobby 2, Robertson & Milner 1. I suspect this is an area is a lot of cleared attacking setpieces and other Palace clearances from balls into their box too."

      Credit to BabuYagu again.
      « Last Edit: Aug 23, 2017 02:54:15 am by Danzel »
      Kharhaz
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      Re: Tactics geeks of the world unite...
      Reply #712: Aug 23, 2017 02:50:31 am
      I look forward to his post when we fail, and why we failed.

      I look forward to his end of season review, and how we failed, and why we failed.

      I look forward to his Champions.....meh whatever, silver lining and all, let the glass half full folks have their moment.

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